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Abstract
Auctions have a long history, having been recorded as early as 500 B.C. [17].
Nowadays, electronic auctions have been a great success and are increasingly used.
Many cryptographic protocols have been proposed to address the various secu-
rity requirements of these electronic transactions, in particular to ensure privacy.
Brandt [4] developed a protocol that computes the winner using homomorphic
operations on a distributed ElGamal encryption of the bids. He claimed that it en-
sures full privacy of the bidders, i.e. no information apart from the winner and the
winning price is leaked. We first show that this protocol – when using malleable
interactive zero-knowledge proofs – is vulnerable to attacks by dishonest bidders.
Such bidders can manipulate the publicly available data in a way that allows the
seller to deduce all participants’ bids. Additionally we discuss some issues with
verifiability as well as attacks on non-repudiation, fairness and the privacy of indi-
vidual bidders exploiting authentication problems.
1 Introduction
Auctions are a simple method to sell goods and services. Typically a seller offers a
good or a service, and the bidders make offers. Depending on the type of auction, the
offers might be sent using sealed envelopes which are opened simultaneously to de-
termine the winner (the “sealed-bid” auction), or an auctioneer could announce prices
decreasingly until one bidder is willing to pay the announced price (the “dutch auc-
tion”). Additionally there might be several rounds, or offers might be announced pub-
licly directly (the “English” or “shout-out” auction). The winner usually is the bidder
submitting the highest bid, but in some cases he might only have to pay the second
highest offer as a price (the “second-price”- or “Vickrey”-Auction). In general a bidder
wants to win the auction at the lowest possible price, and the seller wants to sell his
good at the highest possible price. For more information on different auction methods
see [17]. To address this huge variety of possible auction settings and to achieve dif-
ferent security and efficiency properties numerous protocols have been developed, e.g.
[4, 11, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23] and references therein.
One of the key requirements of electronic auction (e-Auction) protocols is privacy,
i.e. the bids of losing bidders remain private. Brandt proposed a first-price sealed-bid
auction protocol [4, 3, 2] and claimed that it is fully private, i.e. it leaks no information
apart from the winner, the winning bid, and what can be deduced from these two facts
(e.g. that the other bids were lower).
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Our Contributions. The protocol is based on an algorithm that computes the win-
ner using bids encoded as bit vectors. In this paper we show that the implementation
using the homomorphic property of a distributed Elgamal encryption proposed in the
original paper suffers from a weakness. In fact, we prove that any two different inputs
(i.e. different bids) result in different outcome values, which are only hidden using
random values. We show how a dishonest participant can remove this random noise,
if malleable interactive zero-knowledge proofs are used. The seller can then efficiently
compute the bids of all bidders, hence completely breaking privacy. We also discuss
two problems with verifiability, and how the lack of authentication enables attacks on
privacy even if the above attack is prevented via non-malleable non-interactive proofs.
Additionally we show attacks on non-repudiation and fairness, and propose solutions
to all discovered flaws in order to recover a fully resistant protocol.
Outline. In the next section, we recall the protocol of Brandt. Then, in the following
sections, we present our attacks in several steps. In Section 3, we first study the proto-
col using interactive zero-knowledge proofs and without noise. Then we show how a
dishonest participant can remove the noise, thus mount the attack on the protocol with
noise, and discuss countermeasures. Finally, in Section 4, we discuss verifiability and
in Section 5 we discuss attacks on fairness, non-repudiation and privacy exploiting the
lack of authentication.
2 The Protocol
The protocol of Brandt [4] was designed to ensure full privacy in a completely dis-
tributed way. It exploits the homomorphic properties of a distributed El-Gamal en-
cryption scheme [12] for a secure multi-party computation of the winner. Then it uses
zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of discrete logarithms to ensure correctness of
the bids while preserving privacy. We first give a high level description of the protocol
and then present details on its main cryptographic primitives.
2.1 Informal Description
The participating n bidders and the seller communicate essentially using broadcast
messages. The latter can for example be implemented using a bulletin board, i.e. an
append-only memory accessible to everybody. The bids are encoded as k-bit-vectors
where each entry corresponds to a price. If the bidder a wants to bid the price ba, all
entries will be 1, except the entry ba which will be Y (a public constant). Each entry of
the vector is then encrypted separately using a n-out-of-n-encryption scheme set up by
all bidders. The bidders use multiplications of the encrypted values to compute values
vaj , exploiting the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme. Each one of this
values is 1 if the bidder a wins at price j, and is a random number otherwise. The
decryption of the final values takes place in a distributed way to ensure that nobody
can access intermediate values.
2.2 Mathematical Description (Brandt [4])
Let Gq be a multiplicative subgroup of order q, prime, and g a generator of the group.
We consider that i, h ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j, bida ∈ {1, . . . , k} (where bida is the bid chosen
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by the bidder with index a), Y ∈ Gq \ {1}. More precisely, the n bidders execute the
following five steps of the protocol [4]:
1. Key Generation
Each bidder a, whose bidding price is bida among {1, . . . , k} does the following:
• chooses a secret xa ∈ Z/qZ
• chooses randomly maij and raj ∈ Z/qZ for each i and j.
• publishes ya = gxa and proves the knowledge of ya’s discrete logarithm.
• using the published yi then computes y =
∏n
i=1 yi.
2. Bid Encryption
Each bidder a
• sets baj =
{
Y if j = bida
1 otherwise
• publishes αaj = baj · yraj and βaj = graj for each j.
• proves that for all j, logg(βaj) equals logy(αaj) or logy
(αaj
Y
)
, and that
logy
(∏
k
j=1
αaj
Y
)
= logg
(∏k
j=1 βaj
)
.
3. Outcome Computation
• Each bidder a computes and publishes for all i and j:
γaij =



 n∏
h=1
k∏
d=j+1
αhd

 ·
(
j−1∏
d=1
αid
)
·
(
i−1∏
h=1
αhj
)m
a
ij
δaij =



 n∏
h=1
k∏
d=j+1
βhd

 ·
(
j−1∏
d=1
βid
)
·
(
i−1∏
h=1
βhj
)m
a
ij
and proves its correctness.
4. Outcome Decryption
• Each bidder a sends φaij = (
∏n
h=1 δ
h
ij)
xa for each i and j to the seller and
proves its correctness. After having received all values, the seller publishes
φhij for all i, j, and h 6= i.
5. Winner determination
• Everybody can now compute vaj =
∏n
i=1
γiaj∏
n
i=1 φ
i
aj
for each j.
• If vaw = 1 for some w, then the bidder a wins the auction at price pw.
2.3 Malleable proofs of knowledge and discrete logarithms
In the original paper [4] the author suggests using zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge
to protect against active adversaries. The basic protocols he proposes are interactive
and malleable, but can be converted into non-interactive proofs using the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic [13], as advised by the author. We first recall the general idea of such proofs,
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then we expose the man-in-the-middle attacks on the interactive version, which we will
use as part of our first attack.
Let PDL denote a proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm. A first scheme for
PDL was developed in 1986 by Chaum et al. [6]. In the original auction paper [4]
Brandt proposes to use a non-interactive variant of PDL as developed by Schnorr [24],
which are malleable. Unfortunately, interactive malleable PDL are subject to man-in-
the-middle attacks [16]. We first recall the classic Σ-protocol on a group with generator
g and order q [1, 5, 7]. Peggy and Victor know v and g, but only Peggy knows x, so
that v = gx. She can prove this fact, without revealing x, by executing the following
protocol:
1. Peggy chooses r at random and sends z = gr to Victor.
2. Victor chooses a challenge c at random and sends it to Peggy.
3. Peggy sends s = (r + c · x) mod q to Victor.
4. Victor checks that gs = z · vc.
2.3.1 Man-in-the-middle attacks on interactive PDL
Suppose Peggy possesses some secret discrete logarithm x. We present here the man-
in-the-middle attack of [16], where an attacker can pretend to have knowledge of any
affine combination of the secret x, even providing the associated proof of knowledge,
without breaking the discrete logarithm. To prove this possession to say Victor, the
attacker will start an interactive proof knowledge session with Peggy and another one
with Victor. The attacker will transform Peggy’s outputs and forward Victor’s chal-
lenges to her. The idea is to use the proof of possession of Peggy’s x, to prove posses-
sion of 1 − x to Victor. Indeed to prove for instance possession of just x to Victor, an
attacker would only have to forward Peggy’s messages to Victor and Victor’s messages
to Peggy. The idea of the attack is similar, except that one needs to modify the mes-
sages of Peggy. We show the example of 1−x in Figure 1 since it is used in Section 3.4
to mount our attack. Upon demand by Victor to prove knowledge of 1−x, Mallory, the
man-in-the-middle, simply starts a proof of knowledge of xwith Peggy. Peggy chooses
a random exponent r and sends the commitment z = gr to Mallory. Mallory simply
inverts z and sends y = z−1 to Victor. Then Victor presents a challenge c that Mallory
simply forwards without modification to Peggy. Finally Peggy sends a response s that
Mallory combines with c, as u = c − s, to provide a correct answer to Victor. This is
summarized in Figure 1.
Actually, the attack works in the generic settings of [5, 18] or of Σ-protocols [10].
We let f : Γ→ Ω denote a one way homomorphic function between two commutative
groups (Γ,+) and (Ω,×). We use this generalization to prevent possible countermea-
sures of our first attack in Section 3.6.
For an integral value α, α · x ∈ Γ (resp. yα ∈ Ω) denotes α applications of the
group law + (resp. ×). For a secret x ∈ Γ, and any (h, α, β) ∈ Γ × Z2, the attacker
can build a proof of possession of α ·h+β ·x. In the setting of the example of Figure 1,
we used f(x) = gx, h = 1, α = 1 and β = −1.
In the general case also, upon demand of proof by Victor, Mallory starts a proof
with Peggy. The secret of Peggy is x, and the associated witness v is v = f(x). Then
Mallory wants to prove that his witness w corresponds to any combination of x with
a logarithm h that he knows. With only public knowledge and his chosen (h, α, β) ∈
Γ× Z2, Mallory is able to compute w = f(h)α · vβ .
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Peggy Mallory V ictor
Secret : x
Public : g, v = gx g, w = gv−1 g
z = gr
1 : z
// y = z−1
1′ : y
//
c
2 : c
oo c
2′ : c
oo
s = r + c · x
3 : s
// u = c− s
3′ : u
//
Check : gs
?
== z · vc gu
?
== y · wc
Figure 1: Man-in-the-middle PDL of 1− x, with x an unknown discrete logarithm.
For the proof of knowledge, Mallory still modifies the commitment z = f(r) of
Peggy to y = zβ . Mallory forwards the challenge c of Victor without modification.
Finally Mallory transforms the response s of Peggy, still with only public knowledge
and his chosen (h, α, β) ∈ Γ×Z2, as u = c · (α ·h)+β ·s. We summarize this general
attack on Figure 2.
Peggy Mallory V ictor
Secret : x ∈ Γ (h, α, β) ∈ Γ× Z2
Public : v = f(x) w = f(h)α × vβ f
z = f(r)
1 : z
// y = zβ
1′ : y
//
c
2 : c
oo c
2′ : c
oo
s = r + c · x
3 : s
// u = c · (α · h) + β · s
3′ : u
//
Check : f(s)
?
== z × vc f(u)
?
== y × wc
Figure 2: Man-in-the-middle attacks proving knowledge of affine transforms of a secret
discrete logarithm in the generic setting.
Lemma 1. In the man-in-the-middle attack of Figure 2 of the interactive proof of
knowledge of a discrete logarithm, Victor is convinced by Mallory’s proof of knowl-
edge of α · h+ β · x.
Proof. Indeed,
u = c · (α · h) + β · s = c · (α · h) + β · (r + c · x) = β · r + c · (α · h+ β · x). (1)
Now, since z = f(r), y = zβ , v = f(x) and f(h)α × vβ = w, the latter Equation (1)
proves in turn that
f(u) = f(r)β × f(α · h+ β · x)c = zβ × (f(h)α × f(x)β)c = y × wc. (2)
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Now Victor has to verify the commitment-challenge-response (y, c, u) of Mallory for
his witness w. Then Victor needs to checks whether f(u) corresponds to y×wc, which
is the case as shown by the latter Equation (2).
2.3.2 Generalizations to equality of discrete logarithms
We let EQDL denote a proof of equality of several discrete logarithms. Any PDL
can in general easily be transformed to an EQDL by applying it k times on the same
witness. It is often more efficient to combine the application in one as in [8, 9], or more
generally as composition of Σ-protocols, here with two logarithms and two generators
g1 and g2. Peggy wants to prove that she knows x such that v = gx1 and w = gx2 :
1. Peggy chooses r at random and sends λ = gr1 and µ = gr2 to Victor.
2. Victor chooses a challenge c at random and sends it to Peggy.
3. Peggy computes s = (r + c · x) mod q and sends it to Victor.
4. Victor tests if gs1 = λ · vc and gs2 = µ · wc.
This protocol remains malleable, and the previous attacks are still valid since the re-
sponse remains of the form r + c · x.
2.3.3 Countermeasures
Direct countermeasures to the above attacks are to use non-interactive and/or non-
malleable proofs:
• An interactive protocol can be converted into a non-interactive one using the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic [13].
• Also the first PDL by [6] uses bit-flipping, and more generally non-malleable
protocols like [15] could be used.
We will show in the following that if the proofs proposed in the original paper are
not converted into non-interactive proofs, there is an attack on privacy. Note that even
if non-interactive non-malleable zero-knowledge proofs are used, a malicious attacker
in control of the network can nonetheless recover any bidder’s bid as the messages are
not authenticated, as we show in Section 5.
3 Attacking the fully private computations
The first attack we present uses some algebraic properties of the computations per-
formed during the protocol execution.
3.1 Analysis of the outcome computation
The idea is to analyze the computations done in Step 3 of the protocol. Consider the
following example with three bidders and three possible prices. Then the first bidder
6
computes
γ111 = ( (α12 · α13· α22 · α23· α32 · α33) · (1) · (1) )
m1
11
γ112 = ( (α13· α23· α33) · (α11) · (1) )
m1
12
γ113 = ( (1) · (α11 · α12) · (1) )
m1
13
γ121 = ( (α12 · α13· α22 · α23· α32 · α33) · (1) · (α11) )
m1
21
γ122 = ( (α13· α23· α33) · (α21) · (α12) )
m1
22
γ123 = ( (1) · (α21 · α22) · (α13) )
m1
23
γ131 = ( (α12 · α13· α22 · α23· α32 · α33) · (1) · (α11 · α21) )
m1
31
γ132 = ( (α13· α23· α33) · (α31) · (α12 · α22) )
m1
32
γ133 = ( (1) · (α31 · α32) · (α13 · α23) )
m1
33
The second and third bidder do the same computations, but using different random
values maij . Since each αij is either the encryption of 1 or Y , for example the value
γ122 will be an encryption of 1 only if
• nobody submitted a higher bid (the first block) and
• bidder 2 did not bid a lower bid (the second block) and
• no bidder with a lower index submitted the same bid (the third block).
If we ignore the exponentiation by maij , each γaij is the encryption of the product of
several bij’s. Each bij can be either 1 or Y , hence (γaij)−m
a
ij will be the encryption of
a value Y lij , where 0 ≤ lij ≤ n. The lower bound of lij is trivial, the upper bound
follows from the observation that each αij will be used at most once, and that each
bidder will encrypt Y at most once.
Assume for now that we know all lij . We show next that this is sufficient to ob-
tain all bids. Consider the function f which takes as input the following vector1: b =
logY
((
b11, . . . , b1k, b21, . . . , b2k, . . . , bn1, . . . , bnk
)T)
,
and returns the values lij . The input vector is thus a vector of all bid-vectors, where 1
is replaced by 0 and Y by 1. Consider our above example with three bidders and three
possible prices, then we have:
b = logY
((
b11, b12, b13, b21, b22, b23, b31, b32, b33
)T)
.
A particular instance where bidder 1 and 3 submit price 1, and bidder 2 submits price 2
would then look as: b =
(
1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0
)T
. Hence
only the factors α11, α22 and α31 are encryptions of Y , all other α’s are encryp-
tions of 1. By simply counting how often the factors α11, α22 and α31 show up
in each equation as described above, we can compute the following result: f(b) =(
1, 1, 1, 2, 0, 1, 2, 1, 1
)T
. Note that since we chose the input
of f to be a bit-vector, we have to simply count the ones (which correspond to Y ’s) in
particular positions in b, where the positions are determined by the factors inside γaij .
1By abuse of notation we write logs
(
x1, . . . , xn
)
for
(
logs(x1), . . . , logs(xn)
)
.
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Hence we can express f as a matrix, i.e. f(b) = M · b for the following matrix M :
f(b) = M · b =


0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0


·


1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0


=


1
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
1


To see how the matrixM is constructed, consider for example (γa22)−m
a
22 = (α13 ·α23 ·
α33) · (α21) · (α12) which corresponds to the second row in the second vertical block:
• α12 and α13; hence the two ones at position 2 and 3 in the first horizontal block
• α21 and α23; hence the two ones at position 1 and 3 in the second horizontal
block
• α33; hence the one at position 3 in the third horizontal block
More generally, we can see that each 3× 3 block consists of potentially three parts:
• An upper triangular matrix representing all bigger bids.
• On the diagonal we add a lower triangular matrix representing a lower bid by the
same bidder,
• In the lower left half we add an identity matrix representing a bid at the current
price by a bidder with a lower index.
This corresponds exactly to the structure of the products inside each γaij . It is also
equivalent to formula (1) in Section 4.1.1 of the original paper [4] without the random
vector R∗k. In the following we prove that the function f is injective. We then dis-
cuss how this function can be efficiently inverted (i.e. how to compute the bids when
knowing all lij’s).
3.2 Linear algebra toolbox
Let Ik be the k × k identity matrix;
let Lk be a lower k × k triangular matrix with zeroes on the diagonal, ones in the
lower part and zeroes elsewhere; and let Uk be an upper k × k triangular matrix with
zeroes on the diagonal, ones in the upper part, and zeroes elsewhere:
Ik =


1 0 · · · 0
0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. 0
0 · · · 0 1

 Lk =


0 0 · · · 0
1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. 0
1 · · · 1 0

 Uk =


0 1 · · · 1
0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. 1
0 · · · 0 0


By abuse of notation we use I , L and U to denote respectively Ik, Lk and Uk. For
a k × k-matrix Mk we define (Mk)r = M · · ·M (r times) and (Mk)0 = Ik. Let
(e1, . . . , ek) be the canonical basis.
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Lemma 2. Matrices Lk and Uk are nilpotent, i.e. (Uk)k = 0 and (Lk)k = 0.
Lemma 3. If∑kj=1 wj = 1 then we have Lk · w = (1, . . . , 1)T − (Ik + Uk) · w.
Proof. First note that since∑kj=1 wj = 1,
Lk · w =


0 0 · · · 0
1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. 0
1 · · · 1 0

 ·

w1..
.
wk

 =


0
w1
w1 + w2
.
.
.∑k−1
j=1 wj

 =


1−
∑k
j=1 wj
1−
∑k
j=2 wj
.
.
.
1− wk


On the other hand, if we let 1 = (1, . . . , 1)T , we have also:
1− (Ik + Uk) · w = 1−


1 1 · · · 1
0 1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. 1
0 · · · 0 1

 ·

w1..
.
wk

 =


1−
∑k
j=1 wj
1−
∑k
j=2 wj
.
.
.
1− wk


Lemma 4. For z = ei − ej , we have that (Lk + Uk) · z = −z.
Proof. If i = j, then z = 0 and the results is true. Suppose w.l.o.g. that i > j (other-
wise we just prove the result for −z). Then Uk · (ei − ej) =
∑i−1
s=1 es −
∑j−1
s=1 es =∑i−1
s=j es. Similarly Lk · (ei− ej) =
∑k
s=i+1 es−
∑k
s=j+1 es =
∑i
s=j+1−es. There-
fore (Lk + Uk) · (ei − ej) =
∑i−1
s=j es −
∑i
s=j+1 es = ej − ei = −z.
3.3 How to recover the bids when knowing the lij’s
As discussed above, we can represent the function f as a matrix multiplication. Let M
be the following square matrix of size nk × nk:
M =


(U + L) U . . . . . . U
(U + I) (U + L) U . . . U
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
(U + I) . . . (U + I) (U + L) U
(U + I) . . . . . . (U + I) (U + L)

 . Then f(b) = M · b.
The function takes as input a vector composed of n vectors, each of k bits. It returns
the nk values lij , 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ k. As explained above, the structure of
the matrix is defined by the formula that computes γaij , which consists essentially of
three factors: first we multiply all αij which encode bigger bids (represented by the
matrix U ), then we multiply all αij which encode smaller bids by the same bidder
(represented by adding the matrix L on the diagonal), and finally we multiply by all
αij which encode the same bid by bidders with a smaller index (represented by adding
the matrix I on the lower triangle of M ). In our encoding there will be a “1” in the
vector for each Y in the protocol, hence f will count how many Y s are multiplied when
computing γaij . Using this representation we can prove the following theorem.
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Theorem 1. f is injective on valid bid vectors, i.e. for two different correct bid vectors
u = [u1, . . . , uk]
T and v = [v1, . . . , vk]T with u 6= v we have M · u 6= M · v.
Proof. Let u and v be two correct bid vectors such that u 6= v. We want to prove that
M ·u 6= M ·v. We make a proof by contradiction, hence we assume that M ·u = M ·v
or that M · (u− v) = 0. Because u and v are two correct bid vectors, each one of them
is an element of the canonical basis (e1, . . . , ek), i.e. u = ei and v = ej , as shown
in Section 3.1. We denote u − v by z, and consequently z = ei − ej . Knowing that
M ·z = 0, we prove by induction on a that for all a the following property P (a) holds:
P (a) : ∀l, 0 < l ≤ a, diag(Uk−l) · z = 0
where diag(Uk−x) is a nk×nk block diagonal matrix containing only diagonal blocks
of the same matrixUk−x. The validity of P (k) proves in particular that diag(U0)·zl =
0, i.e. z = 0 which contradicts our hypothesis.
• Case a = 1: we also prove this base case by induction, i.e. for all b ≥ 1 the
property Q(b) holds, where:
Q(b) : ∀m, 0 < m ≤ b, Uk−1 · zm = 0
which gives us that Uk−1 · z = 0.
– Base case b = 1: We start by looking at the multiplication of the first row
of M with z. We obtain: (L + U) · z1 + U · (z2 + . . .+ zk) = 0. We can
multiply each side by Uk−1, and use Lemma 4 to obtain: Uk−1 · [−z1 +
Uk · (z2 + . . .+ zk)] = 0. Since U is nilpotent, according to Lemma 2 the
latter gives −Uk−1 · z1 = 0. Hence we know Q(1) : Uk−1 · z1 = 0, i.e.
the last entry of z1 is 0.
– Inductive step b+ 1: assume Q(b). Consider now the multiplication of the
(b + 1)-th row of the matrix M :
(U+I) ·z1+ . . .+(U+I) ·zb+(L+U) ·zb+1+U ·(zb+2+ . . .+zk) = 0.
Then by multiplying by Uk−1 and using Lemma 4 we obtain:
Uk−1 · [(U +I) ·z1+ . . .+(U +I) ·zb−zb+1+U · (zb+2+ . . .+zk)] = 0.
Since U is nilpotent according to Lemma 2 we have Uk−1 · z1 + . . . +
Uk−1 · zb − U
k−1 · zb+1 = 0. Using the fact that for all m < b we have
Uk−1 · zm = 0, the latter gives −Uk−1 · zb+1 = 0.
• Inductive step a + 1: assume P (a). By induction on b ≥ 1 we will show that
Q′(b) holds, where
Q′(b) : ∀m, 0 < m ≤ b, Uk−(a+1) · zm = 0
which gives us that Uk−(a+1) · z = 0, i.e. P (a+ 1).
– Base case b = 1: Consider the multiplication of the first row withUk−(a+1):
Uk−(a+1) · [(L+U) · z1 +U · (z2 + . . .+ zk)] = 0 which can be rewritten
as −Uk−(a+1) · z1 +U
k−a · (z2 + . . .+ zk)] = 0. Using Uk−a · zl = 0 for
all l, we can conclude that −Uk−(a+1) · z1 = 0, i.e. Q′(1) holds.
– Inductive step b+1: assume Q′(b). Consider now the (b+1)-th row of the
matrix M :
(U+I) ·z1+ . . .+(U+I) ·zb+(L+U) ·zb+1+U ·(zb+2+ . . .+zk) = 0.
Then by multiplying by Uk−(a+1) and using Lemma 4 we obtain:
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Uk−(a+1)·[(U+I)·z1+. . .+(U+I)·zb+−zb+1+U ·(zb+2+. . .+zk)] = 0.
Using Uk−a · zl = 0 for all l, we can conclude that Uk−(a+1) · z1 + . . .+
Uk−(a+1) · zb − U
k−(a+1) · zb+1 = 0. Now, for all m < b, we have
Uk−(a+1) ·zm = 0, so that−Uk−(a+1) ·zb+1 = 0; i.e. Q′(b+1) holds.
This theorem shows that if there is a constellation of bids that led to certain values
lij , this constellation is unique. Hence we are able to invert f on valid outputs. We will
now show that this can be efficiently done.
3.3.1 An efficient algorithm
Our aim is to solve the following linear system: M · x = l. We will use the same steps
we used for the proof of injectivity to solve this system efficiently.
Consider the r-th block of size k of the latter system. We have xr = (xr,1, xr,2, . . . ,
xr,k)
and the r-th block of M · x is
(U + I)x1 + . . .+ (U + I)xr−1 + (L+ U)xr + Uxr+1 + . . .+ Uxn
= U(
∑n
i=1 xi) + (
∑r−1
i=1 xi) + Lxr.
As the r-th block of l is lr, we thus have: U (
∑n
i=1 xi) +
∑r−1
i=1 xi + Lxr = lr.
Using Lemma 3, withwj = xr,j for j = 1..k, we can exchangeL in the latter to get
U (
∑n
i=1 xi)+
∑r−1
i=1 xi+(1− (I + U)xr) = lr. Hence, U (
∑n
i=1 xi)+
∑r−1
i=1 xi+
1− xr − Uxr = lr, so that we now have:{
x1 = 1− l1 + U (
∑n
i=2 xi)
xr = 1− lr +
∑r−1
i=1 xi + U
(∑n
i=1,i6=r xi
)
if 1 < r ≤ n
(3)
This gives us a formula to compute the values of xi,j , starting with the last element
of the first block x1,k. Then we can compute the last elements of all other blocks
x2,k, . . . , xn,k, and then the second to last elements x1,k−1, . . . , xn,k−1, etc.
The idea is to project the above Equation (3) on the t-th coordinate. Then, the t-th
row of U has ones only starting at index t+1, and thus the t-th row of Uz involves only
the elements zt+1, . . . , zk. We thus have: eTt U
(∑n
i=1,i6=r xi
)
=
∑k
j=t+1
∑n
i=1,i6=r xi,j
for t < k and eTkU = 0. Now eTt xr = xr,t, eTt lr = lr,t and eTt 1 = 1. Hence, we
therefore get the following where at row t, the right hand side involves only already
computed values:

x1,k = 1− l1,k
xr,k = 1− lr,k +
r−1∑
i=1
xi,k if 1 < r ≤ n
x1,t = 1− l1,t +
k∑
j=t+1
n∑
i=2
xi,j if 1 ≤ t < k
xr,t = 1− lr,t +
r−1∑
i=1
xi,t +
k∑
j=t+1
n∑
i=1,i6=r
xi,j if 1 ≤ t < k and 1 < r ≤ n
(4)
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3.3.2 Complexity Analysis.
To obtain all values, we have to apply the above Formula (4) for each 1 ≤ r ≤ n and
1 ≤ t ≤ k, hence we can bound the arithmetic cost by:
n∑
r=1
k∑
t=1
(r + (k − t)n) =
1
2
n2k2 + o
(
n2k2
)
This is efficient enough to be computed on a standard PC for realistic values of n (the
number of bidders) and k (the number of possible bids). Those could be less than a
hundred bidders with a thousand different prices, thus requiring about the order of only
some giga arithmetic operations. It is anyway the order of magnitude of the number of
operations required to compute all the encrypted bids.
3.4 Attack on the random noise: how to obtain the lij’s
In the previous section we showed that knowing the lij ’s allows us the efficiently break
the privacy of all bidders. Here is how to obtain the lij’s.
The seller will learn all vij =
(
Y lij
)(∑n
h=1
mhij) at the end of the protocol. Since
the mhij are randomly chosen, this will be a random value if lij 6= 0. However a
malicious bidder (“Mallory”, of index a) can cancel out the mhij as follows: in Step 3
of the protocol each bidder will compute his γaij and δaij . Mallory waits until all other
bidders have published their values (the protocol does not impose any synchronization
or special ordering) and then computes his values γωij and δωij as:
γωij =
((∏n
h=1
∏k
d=j+1 αhd
)
·
(∏j−1
d=1 αid
)
·
(∏i−1
h=1 αhj
))
·
(∏
k 6=ω γ
k
ij
)−1
δωij =
((∏n
h=1
∏k
d=j+1 βhd
)
·
(∏j−1
d=1 βid
)
·
(∏i−1
h=1 βhj
))
·
(∏
k 6=ω δ
k
ij
)−1
The first part is a correct encryption of Y lij , with mωij = 1 for all i and j. The second
part is the inverse of the product of all the other bidders γkij and δkij , and thus it will
eliminate the random exponents. Hence after decryption the seller obtains vij = Y lij ,
where lij < n for a small n. He can compute lij by simply (pre-)computing all possible
values Y r and testing for equality. This allows the seller to obtain the necessary values
and then to use the resolution algorithm to obtain each bidder’s bid. Note that although
we changed the intermediate values, the output still gives the correct result (i.e. winning
bid). Therefore, the attack might even be unnoticed by the other participants. Note also
that choosing a different Yi per bidder does not prevent the attack, since all the Yi need
to be public in order to prove the correctness of the bid in Step 2 of the protocol.
However the protocol requires Mallory to prove that γωij and δωij have the same
exponent. This is obviously the case, but Mallory does not know the exact value of
this exponent. Thus it is impossible for him to execute the proposed zero-knowledge
protocol directly.
In the original paper [4] the malleable interactive proof of [8], presented in Sec-
tion 2.3, is used to prove the correctness of γaij and δaij in Step 3 of the protocol.
If this proof is not converted into a non-interactive proof, then Mallory is able to
fake it as follows.
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3.5 Proof of equality of the presented outcomes
Note that we can rewrite γωij and δωij as:
v = γωij =



 n∏
h=1
k∏
d=j+1
αhd

 ·
(
j−1∏
d=1
αid
)
·
(
i−1∏
h=1
αhj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
g1
1−(
∑
k 6=ω m
k
ij)
w = δωij =



 n∏
h=1
k∏
d=j+1
βhd

 ·
(
j−1∏
d=1
βid
)
·
(
i−1∏
h=1
βhj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
g2
1−(
∑
k 6=ω m
k
ij)
When Mallory, the bidderm, is asked by Victor for a proof of correctness of his values,
he starts by asking all other bidders for proofs to initialize the man-in-the-middle attack
of Figure 1. Each of them answers with values λo = gzo1 and µo = g
zo
2 . Mallory can
then answer Victor with values λ =
∏
o λ
−1
o and µ =
∏
o µ
−1
o , where o ∈ ([1, n] \m).
Victor then sends a challenge c, which Mallory simply forwards to the other bidders.
They answer with ro = zo + c · moij , and Mallory sends r = c −
∑
o ro to Victor,
who can check that gr1 = λ · vc and gr2 = µ · wc. If the other bidders did their proofs
correctly, then Mallory’s proof will appear valid to Victor:
λ · vc =
∏
o λ
−1
o ·
(
g
1−(
∑
o m
o
ij)
1
)c
=
∏
o g
−zo
1 · g
c−c(
∑
o m
o
ij)
1 = g
c−
∑
o(zo+cm
o
ij)
1
µ · wc =
∏
o µ
−1
o ·
(
g
1−(
∑
o m
o
ij)
2
)c
=
∏
o g
−zo
2 · g
c−c(
∑
o m
o
ij)
2 = g
c−
∑
o(zo+cm
o
ij)
2
Hence in the case of malleable interactive zero-knowledge proofs Mallory is able to
modify the values γωij and δωij as necessary, and even prove the correctness using the
bidders. Hence the modifications may stay undetected and the seller will be able to
break privacy.
3.6 The complete attack and countermeasures
Putting everything together, the attack works as follows:
1. The bidders set up the keys as described in the protocol.
2. They encrypt and publish their bids.
3. They compute γhij and δhij and publish them.
4. Mallory, who is a bidder himself, waits until all other bidders have published
their values. He then computes his values as defined above, and publishes them.
5. If he is asked for a proof, he can proceed as explained above in Section 3.5.
6. The bidders (including Mallory) jointly decrypt the values.
7. The seller obtains all Y lij ’s. He can then compute the lij’s by testing at most n
possibilities.
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8. Once he has all values, he can invert the function f as explained above.
9. He obtains all bidders bids.
Again, note that for all honest bidders, this execution will look normal, so they might
not even notice that an attack took place.
To prevent this attack, one could perform the following actions:
• To counteract the removal of the noise of Section 3.4, the bidders could check
whether the product of the γai,j for all bidders a is equal to the product of the αhd
without any noise (exponent is 1). Unfortunately, the man-in-the-middle attack
generalizes to any exponent as shown in Figure 2. Therefore the attacker could
use a randomly chosen exponent only known to him.
• As mentioned above, another countermeasure is the use of non-interactive, non-
malleable proofs of knowledge. In this case, we will show in Section 5 that it is
still possible to attack a targeted bidder’s privacy.
4 Attacking verifiability
Brandt claims that the protocol is verifiable as the parties have to provide zero-knowledge
proofs for their computations, however there are two problems.
4.1 Exceptional values
First, a winning bidder cannot verify if he actually won. To achieve privacy, the pro-
tocol hides all outputs of vaj except for the entry containing “1”2. This is done by
exponentiation with random values maij inside all entries γaij and δaij , i.e. by computing
x
∑
a m
a
ij
ij where xij is the product of some αij as specified in the protocol. If xij is one,
xmij will still return one for any m, and in principle something different from one for
any other value of xij . Now, the random values maij may add up to zero (mod q), hence
the returned value will be xmij = x0ij = 1 and the bidder will conclude that he won,
although he actually lost (xij 6= 1). Hence simply verifying the proofs is not sufficient
to be convinced that the observed outcome is correct. For the same reason the seller
might observe two or more “1”-values, even though all proofs are correct. In such a
situation he is unable to decide which bidder actually won since he cannot determine
which “1”s correspond to a real bids, and hence which bid is the highest real bid. If two
“1”s correspond to real bids, he could even exploit such a situation to his advantage: he
can tell both bidders that they won and take money from both, although there is only
one good to sell – this is normally prohibited by the protocol’s tie-breaking mechanism.
If the bidders do not exchange additional data there is no way for them to discover that
something went wrong, since the seller is the only party having access to all values.
A solution to this problem could work as follows: when computing the γaij and δaij ,
the bidders can check if the product
xij =

 n∏
h=1
k∏
d=j+1
αhd

 ·
(
j−1∏
d=1
αid
)
·
(
i−1∏
h=1
αhj
)
2Note that the protocol contains a mechanism to resolve ties, i.e. there should always be exactly one entry
equal to 1, even in the presence of ties.
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is equal to one – if yes, they restart the protocol using different keys and random values.
If not, they continue, and check if
∏
a γ
a
ij = 1. If yes, they choose different random
values maij and re-compute the γaij and δaij , otherwise they continue. Since the prob-
ability of the random values adding up to zero is low, this will rapidly lead to correct
values.
4.2 Different private keys
Second, the paper does not precisely specify the proofs that have to be provided in the
joint decryption phase. If the bidders only prove that they use the same private key
on all decryptions and not also that it is the one they used to generate their public
key, they may use a wrong one. This will lead to a wrong decryption where with
very high probability no value is “1”, as they will be random. Hence all bidders will
think that they lost, thus allowing a malicious bidder to block the whole auction, as
no winner is determined. Hence, if we assume that the verification test consists in
verifying the proofs, a bidder trying to verify that he lost using the proofs might perform
the verification successfully, although the result is incorrect and he actually won – since
he would have observed a “1” if the vector had been correctly decrypted.
This problem can be addressed by requiring the bidders to also prove that they used
the same private key as in the key generation phase.
5 Attacks using the lack of authentication
The protocol as described in the original paper does not include any authentication of
the messages. This means that an attacker in control of the network can impersonate
any party, which can be exploited in many ways. However, the authors supposed in
the original paper a “reliable broadcast channel, i.e. the adversary has no control of
communication” [4]. Yet even under this assumption dishonest participants can im-
personate other participants by submitting messages on their behalf. Additionally, this
assumption is difficult to achieve in asynchronous systems [14]. In the following we
consider an attacker in control of the network, however many attacks can also be exe-
cuted analogously by dishonest parties (which are considered in the original paper) in
the reliable broadcast setting.
5.1 Another attack on privacy
Our first attack on privacy only works in the case of malleable interactive proofs. If we
switch to non-interactive non-malleable proofs, Mallory cannot ask the other bidders
for proofs using a challenge of his choice.
However, even with non-interactive non-malleable zero-knowledge proofs, the pro-
tocol is still vulnerable to attacks on a targeted bidder’s privacy if an attacker can im-
personate any bidder of his choice as well as the seller, which is the case for an attacker
controlling the network due to the lack of authentication. In particular, if he wants to
know Alice’s bid he can proceed as follows:
1. Mallory impersonates all other bidders. He starts by creating keys on their behalf
and publishes the values yi and the corresponding proofs for all of them.
2. Alice also creates her secret keyshare and publishes ya together with a proof.
3. Alice and Mallory compute the public key y.
15
4. Alice encrypts her bid and publishes her αaj and βbj together with the proofs.
5. Mallory publishes αij = αaj and βij = βaj for all other bidders i and also
copies Alice’s proofs.
6. Alice and Mallory execute the computations described in the protocol and pub-
lish γaij and δaij .
7. They compute φaij and send it to the seller.
8. The seller publishes the φaij and computes the vaj .
Since all submitted bids are equal, the seller (which might also be impersonated by
Mallory) will obtain Alice’s bid as the winning price, hence it is not private any more.
This attack essentially simulates a whole instance of the protocol to make Alice indi-
rectly reveal a bid that was intended for another, probably real auction. To counteract
this it is not sufficient for Alice to check that the other bids are different: Mallory
can produce different αij = αajyx together with βij = βajgx which are still correct
encryptions of Alice bids.
Note that the same attack also works if dishonest bidders collude with the seller:
they simply re-submit the targeted bidders bid as their own bid.
5.2 Attacking fairness, non-repudiation and verifiability
The lack of authentication obviously entails that a winning bidder can claim that he
did not submit his bid, hence violating non-repudiation (even in the case of reliable
broadcast). Additionally, this also enables an attack on fairness: an attacker in control
of the network can impersonate all bidders vis-a`-vis the seller, submitting bids of his
choice on their behalf and hence completely controlling the winner and winning price.
This also causes another problem with verifiability: it is impossible to verify if the bids
were submitted by the registered bidders or by somebody else.
5.3 Countermeasures
The solution to these problems is simple: all the messages need to be authenticated, e.g.
using signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) based on a trust anchor, for
example a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the protocol of Brandt [4] from various angles. We show that
the underlying computations have a weakness which can be exploited by malicious bid-
ders to break privacy if malleable interactive zero-knowledge proofs are used. We also
identified two problems with verifiability and proposed solutions. Finally we showed
how the lack of authentication can be used to mount different attacks on privacy, ver-
ifiability as well as fairness and non-repudiation. Again we suggested a solution to
address the discovered flaws.
So sum up, the following countermeasures have to be implemented:
• Use of non-interactive or non-malleable zero-knowledge proofs.
• All messages have to be authenticated, e.g. using a Public-Key Infrastructure
(PKI) and signatures.
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• In the outcome computation step: when computing the γaij and δaij , the bidders
can check if xij =
(∏n
h=1
∏k
d=j+1 αhd
)
·
(∏j−1
d=1 αid
)
·
(∏i−1
h=1 αhj
)
is equal
to one – if yes, they restart the protocol using different keys and random values.
If not, they continue, and check if
∏
a γ
a
ij = 1. If yes, they choose different
random values maij and re-compute the γaij and δaij , otherwise they continue.
• In the outcome decryption step: the bidders have to prove that the value xa they
used to decrypt is the same xa they used to generate their public key ya in the
first step.
The attacks show that properties such as authentication can be necessary to achieve
other properties which might appear to be unrelated at first sight, like for instance
privacy. It also points out that there is a difference between computing the winner in
a fully private way, and ensuring privacy for the bidders: in the second attack we use
modified inputs to break privacy even though the computations themselves are secure.
Additionally our analysis highlights that the choice of interactive or non-interactive,
malleable or non-malleable proofs is an important decision in any protocol design.
As for possible generalizations of our attacks, of course the linear algebra part
of our first attack is specific to this protocol. Yet the man-in-the-middle attack on
malleable proofs as well as the need of authentication for privacy are applicable to any
protocol. Similarly, checking all exceptional cases and ensuring that the same keys are
used all along the process are also valid insights for other protocols.
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